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A B S T R A C T   
Safety assessment of technologies and interventions is often underdetermined by evidence. For example, sci-
entists have collected evidence concerning genetically modified plants for decades. This evidence was used to 
ground opposing safety protocols for “stacked genetically modified” plants, in which two or more genetically 
modified plants are combined. Evidence based policy would thus be rendered more effective by an approach that 
accounts for underdetermination. Douglas (2012) proposes an explanatory approach, based on the criteria of 
transparency, empirical competence, internal consistency of explanations, and predictive potency. However, 
sometimes multiple explanations can satisfy these criteria. We propose an additional criterion based on converse 
abduction, where explanations are selected on the basis of ontological background assumptions as well as by 
evidence. We then apply our proposed scheme to the case of the regulation of stacked genetically modified 
plants. We discuss the implications and suggest follow-up work concerning the generalizability of the approach.   
1. Introduction 
A challenge when relying on science as a key element for governance 
is that experts interpret scientific data differently, and disagree on how 
to weigh evidence, even when a reasonable amount of data is collected 
(Douglas, 2000; Sawyer & Loja, 2015). This is not surprising, since 
scientific evaluation often involves diverging evidence from different 
disciplines. Lab model experiments, for instance, might show a toxic 
endpoint for a certain chemical and indicate a certain mechanism of 
action for the toxic effect, while population studies show the toxicity as 
statistically insignificant. Evaluating how to weigh evidence in such 
cases can be challenging, and crucially, it is not a purely empirical 
matter. It depends instead on a series of extra-evidential premises 
(Weed, 2005; Williamson, 2017). In such cases of evidential under-
determination, then, one cannot rationally counsel policy choices about 
risk and benefits of technologies and interventions, based on scientific 
evidence alone. 
Here we offer a possible complement to the approach proposed by 
philosophers such as Heather Douglas (Douglas, 2000) and Helen 
Longino (Longino, 1990), who argue that decision-making can be 
improved by a plurality of diverging scientific advice, so long as each 
position is transparent about the extra-evidential premises that it adopts. 
Thus, different evaluations of the same evidence ought to meet some 
specific requirements. These include, among others, completeness, 
rigor, transparency, and communicability to non-experts (Douglas, 
2012). When multiple scientific evaluations meet these requirements, 
they can be compared in a way that emphasizes the core of the 
disagreement. This sets a premise for the solution of such disagreements. 
As discussed in Douglas (2012), none of the conventional approaches 
to the evaluation of the scientific evidence fully meets the criteria listed 
above. As a case in point, consider the “rule-based” approaches to evi-
dence evaluation, such as the “pyramid of evidence” found in 
evidence-based medicine. The pyramid indicates a hierarchy in which 
evidence from systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials is 
considered the most reliable, while evidence from case series or causal 
mechanisms are given low epistemic status. Although this method is 
rigorous and systematic, it might, on the basis of a general rule, exclude 
evidence that is particularly relevant for a specific case, and therefore 
lack completeness (Clarke 2013; Greenhalgh et al., 2014). 
Algorithm-based approaches, such as Bayesian networks, can be both 
complete and rigorous, but they hardly ever meet the requirements for 
transparency or communicability. This is due to the fact that basic as-
sumptions and general reasoning are adopted by the programmer, but 
remain hidden to the users. Social approaches such as elicitation of 
expert opinions are likely to be more transparent, but less rigorous 
(Douglas, 2012). 
In response to this, Douglas (2012) proposes an alternative, quali-
tative approach to evidence evaluation, based on explanations. An 
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interesting aspect of this approach is that it benefits from an increasing 
number of possible explanations of the same evidence. It is therefore an 
approach that takes underdetermination seriously. Douglas’ approach 
is, however, admittedly limited, and here we suggest a development 
based on our view of expert disagreement, which focuses on ontological 
background assumptions. 
The philosophical discourse over evidential underdetermination, 
and its effects on scientific investigation as well as, later on, knowledge- 
based decision making, traditionally focuses on the works of Duhem and 
Quine (Kyle, 2017) or Poincaré (Worrall, 1989) at the turn of the 20th 
century. Duhem, for instance, argued that any scientific evidence is 
evaluated from a pre-existing web of knowledge and beliefs which are 
“beyond dispute” (Duhem, 1914, p 185). These beliefs contribute to the 
formation of scientific explanations and theories together with the 
empirical evidence at hand. A scientific explanation, accordingly, is 
determined not only by evidence, but also by a series of pre-existing 
assumptions and “impinges on experience only along the edges” 
(Quine, 1951, p. 42). 
The relation between underdetermination, expert disagreement and 
pre-existing assumptions, has been a recurring issue in science since the 
sixteenth century. Crucially, Kepler and Galilei adopted strategies for 
dealing with such issues, and we wish to draw on their strategies here. 
Kepler and Galilei approached underdetermination by weighing evi-
dence based on what they considered the most plausible ontological 
background assumptions. This strategy has been called converse abduc-
tion (see Andersen, 2017; Myrstad, 2004). 
By recalling Galilean-Keplerian arguments relating to evidential 
underdetermination in astronomy and physics, we aim to gain insights 
on a current instance of the same type of problem: the evidential 
underdetermination in scientific safety assessment of technologies and 
human interventions. We use the classic case of underdetermination of 
theories of planetary motion for two reasons. The first is that it is a 
standard example of empirical equivalents (Van Fraassen, 1980): 
diverging theories that are equally well supported by evidence, which 
makes our point easier to show. The second is that underdetermination 
was solved through selection of the most defendable ontological back-
ground assumption, which then played the role of tie breaker. In other 
words, we want to offer a clear example where ontology picked up 
where epistemology dropped off, and show how and why such a strategy 
can succeed. 
We recognize that the different extra-evidential components of 
evidence-evaluation, both epistemological, ontological and ethical/po-
litical, are essential and integrated parts of evidence-based policy. 
Therefore, by transposing a strategy from the historical case to the 
current picture, we also consider the complexities of modern evidence- 
based policy through a final case-study: The scientific controversy over a 
variety of stacked genetically modified corn. We already analyzed this 
case in terms of diverging background assumptions of an ontological 
type in Rocca & Andersen, (2017). Here, we show how converse 
abduction could be used to resolve the underdetermination issue. 
2. Why do experts disagree about common evidence? 
In the realm of evidence-based policymaking, scientific disagreement 
over common evidence is usually analyzed in two ways. Some analyze 
the issue in terms of conflicting socio-political value judgements 
(Hartley et al., 2016; Holman & Bruner, 2017; Wickson & Wynne, 
2012). Others analyze it in terms of “epistemologically deep” disagree-
ments, meaning that “the interlocutors have radically different ideas - 
not about what kinds of things exist, but rather - about what kinds of 
research should be carried out in order to support or undermine a claim” 
(Hicks, 2015, p. 2). Hicks (2015) argues that opposing parties generally 
agree on the basic concepts involved. For instance, scientists agree on 
what a crop yield is. The disagreement is about which methodology is 
best suited for comparing the yield of conventional and genetically 
modified plants (Hicks, 2015). 
Contrary to Hicks we argue that expert disagreement is often onto-
logical in nature, even when the divergence appears to be merely 
epistemic. As an illustration of controversies rooted in ontology, we 
recall the roots of modern scientific practice: the scientific revolution. 
The switch to the new type of inquiry - the scientific inquiry – was itself 
the resolution of underdetermination through a debate over which 
ontological background assumptions one should adopt. 
Galilei (1615) describes science as a knowledge generating process 
that starts from what he calls “primary suppositions”. In the Galilean 
definition, a primary supposition is a background assumption or a basic 
world-view that a scientist adopts prior to any empirical investigation. 
Since those background assumptions concern the nature of things, we 
call them ontological background assumptions. 
Reichenbach (1958), Kuhn (1970) and Einstein, (1936) argued that 
such assumptions are prerequisites for scientific research, the idea being 
that any experimental set-up and interpretation of data requires theo-
retical justification. Ontological background assumptions are the most 
basic element of such justifications. In the words of Einstein, they 
resemble “… rules of the game in which, while the rules themselves are 
arbitrary, it is their rigidity alone which makes the game possible” 
(Einstein, 1936: 292). If ontological background assumptions set the 
rules of the game, they are part of the fabric of science. We adopt this 
idea here as a premise for our proposition on how to deal with under-
determination of expert judgements. 
In Rocca & Andersen, (2017), we describe the function of back-
ground assumptions as follows: 
“Background assumptions are more general than new evidence, and 
play a regulatory function in relation to it. This means that, whatever 
their origin, background assumptions co-determine how a scientist 
chooses methodology, analyses data, and picks out relevant evi-
dence. In short, background assumptions are the lens through which 
we view new information.” (Rocca & Andersen, 2017: 2) 
Notice that, although we maintain that ontological, epistemological 
and socio-political background assumptions are components of scientific 
inquiry, we emphasize ontological background assumptions here. To our 
knowledge, these have received comparative little attention in the 
literature on evidence-based policy and responsible research and inno-
vation.1 Our claim is that different ontological background assumptions 
sometimes motivate different rules of scientific inquiry, such as the 
choice of the most reliable methods for collecting and analyzing evi-
dence, and the overall significance of such evidence. In other words, 
apparent epistemic disagreement is sometimes rooted in diverging on-
tologies. The role of ontological background assumptions in theory 
building is commonly debated in certain parts of philosophy of basic 
sciences (Stump, 2015; Nicholson and Dupre’ 2018); however, it has not 
been extensively discussed within the field of evidence based policy 
(Rocca & Andersen, 2017). 
Hicks (2015), assumes that many “socially relevant” controversies do 
not involve diverging background assumptions of an ontological type. It 
is possible, however, that diverging ontological background assumption 
are present, but remain implicit and therefore hidden in the debates. 
From this perspective, there is less talk of ontological depth in socially 
relevant scientific controversies (such as the health risk of tobacco or the 
secondary effects of prescription drugs) because such controversies have 
not been actively analyzed in terms of ontology. We choose the latter 
explanation for three reasons. The first reason, which has been widely 
accepted in the literature, is that ontological background assumptions 
are part of scientific inquiry. This does not imply that all expert 
disagreement is due to diverging ontological background assumptions. 
1 While we agree with arguments about the inter-dependency and mutual 
value of these three types of background assumptions (see Longino, 1996), we 
maintain that it is crucial to fully understand the potential significance of each 
type. 
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Neither does it imply that whenever there are diverging ontological 
background assumptions, experts will disagree. For instance, Einstein 
and Lorentz disagreed on the nature of time and space but agreed on the 
formation of theories, the mathematical framework and the physical 
predictions (Andersen, 2017). So, diverging ontological background 
assumptions do not guarantee disagreement on all specifics. We do 
however argue that diverging ontological background assumptions 
might be at the root of controversies more often than generally assumed. 
The second reason is that there is evidence for the existence of 
contrasting ontological background assumptions outside the realm of 
basic science. Some examples of this include: ecologists and molecular 
biologists who conceptualize genes differently (Carver et al., 2008; Stotz 
et al., 2004); big-data scientists who conceptualize space differently 
(Leonelli 2018); toxicologists who conceptualize the dose-response 
curve differently (Calabrese & Baldwin, 2003); risk researchers who 
conceptualize community differently (Paveglio et al., 2017); and so on. 
We see therefore, that there are diverging ontological views both be-
tween fields and within fields. These kinds of discrepancies are at the 
roots of, or at least contribute to, some expert disagreement, but this 
remains implicit. 
A third reason is that in some case studies taken from basic and 
applied science, different ontological background assumptions were 
shown to motivate different scientific norms (Anjum & Mumford, 2018). 
For instance, ontological background assumptions motivated different 
scientific assessments of harm and benefits for technologies (Andersen 
et al., 2019; Anjum, 2016; Anjum & Rocca, 2018; Rocca, 2018; Rocca & 
Andersen, 2017; Rocca & Anjum, 2019). Many ontological background 
assumptions involved in applied research appear to be adopted uncrit-
ically and remain implicit. Disclosing them, and openly assessing their 
role in grounding risk evaluation, is therefore a crucial step in fully 
explicating a scientific opinion. 
We here state that implicit ontological background assumptions are 
(i) necessary, (ii) can be divergent, and (iii) create norms of inquiry. But 
how does this work, in practice? We will address this question by 
examining a current and controversial case in evidence evaluation and 
risk assessment. However, prior to this we shall illustrate our point by 
using a textbook example, that is, the Galilean defense of the Copernican 
theory.  
(i) The Ptolemaic theory, which was the standard framework, was 
set within Aristotelian physics, cosmology and ontology. It 
therefore applied ontological background assumptions about 
teleology, natural and unnatural motions, different materials for 
the earth and the planets, as well as assumptions that “… celestial 
movements are all circular and regular, namely uniform; that 
heaven has a spherical shape; that the earth is at the center of the 
celestial sphere, is spherical, motionless, etc.” (Galilei, 1615, 
p.85). That the earth is motionless follows directly from the 
Aristotelian ontology which is presupposed.2 From these as-
sumptions we get a set of meaningful questions, such as why 
planets appear to display retrograde motions, rather than “cir-
cular and regular” ones (the planets appear to move backwards at 
regular intervals, and then forward again). Without the onto-
logical background assumptions, retrograde motions could be 
thought of as brute facts, rather than problems. Here we see that 
background assumptions determine meaningful questions.  
(ii) The Copernican theory starts from a different and unified 
ontology, where the earth and the other planets consist of similar 
materials and there is no notion of natural and unnatural 
motions. The theory states that the earth can and does move. 
Galilei expanded the ontology into a new full alternative. In this 
ontological framework, earth’s motion can be taken as brute fact 
since there is no ontological reason why it should be motionless. 
However, new sets of questions arise, such as why we do not 
experience the motion of the earth directly. Here we see how 
diverging ontological background assumptions motivate new 
research questions.  
(iii) Through the Copernican ontology, Galilei develops a new theory 
of motion in which relative motions can be measured, while 
shared motions cannot (the principle of relativity). This principle 
resolves a series of objections to the Copernican theory, as it 
shows how a set of questions are either answered or become 
meaningless. In effect, the norms of inquiry change when Galilei 
adopts a new ontology. 
Note that the new Galilean theory of motion does not stem from new 
observations. It considers the same empirical observations that underlie 
the Ptolemaic theory. The new theory is a re-conceptualization that 
Galilei needs to introduce in order to understand the same relevant 
empirical evidence through the lens of the ontological assumption 
“movable earth”. 
So far, we have set the premise that ontological background as-
sumptions are intrinsic aspects of science, that there are diverging po-
sitions, and that these positions lead to diverging scientific norms. In 
what follows, we show how this perspective warrants a development of 
the explanatory approach to evidence evaluation (Douglas, 2012). 
However, before we proceed, we will sketch Douglas’ approach and the 
specific limitation that we aim to amend. 
3. The explanatory approach to evidence evaluation 
In parallel with the Galilean view, Douglas starts her approach from 
the idea that 
“experts often differ in their assessments of the complex sets of evi-
dence because they have different explanations of why the evidence 
looks the way it does.” (Douglas, 2012: 152) 
Douglas’ explanatory approach is based on multiple conflicting 
evaluations of the same evidence. Crucially, each evaluation must be 
accompanied by an explicit explanation of why the evidence looks the 
way it does. Different explanations might adopt different evaluations 
concerning the relevance of an animal model, the importance of a 
chemical pathway, or the conclusiveness of an epidemiological study for 
the purpose of detecting causal relationships (Douglas, 2012). 
The approach consists of three main steps: 
“The first step is to gather and develop the competing explanatory 
accounts. The second step is to assess which of the competitors is 
adequate […]. The third step is to assess which of the remaining 
competitors is best.” (Douglas, 2012: 152) 
Adequacy is further operationalized into three criteria: internal 
consistency, empirical competency, and predictive potential. However, 
these criteria are not always stringent; it is often the case that two or 
more scientifically defendable explanations apparently meet all three 
criteria. 
Consider, for instance, the scientific assessment of long-term health 
effects on the Ecuadorian communities that are exposed to pollutants 
resulting from oil extraction. Environmental epidemiologists gave split 
opinions about the risk of such exposure based on the same available 
evidence, and they explained such opinions with equally defensible 
stances. Some experts valued the evidence for a mechanism of harmful 
oil contaminants, with the high levels of oil contamination in drinking 
water and heavy metals in the resident’s blood as sufficient reason to 
infer a high risk for long-term exposure. They explained the lack of 
2 Aristotelian ontology states that the “heavier” materials, earth and water, 
seek the centre of the universe by their natural motion. The earth, whose sur-
face consists of earth and water, is assumed to be at the centre of the universe 
and must therefore be motionless. If the earth moved, it would move away from 
its natural place, which would be an unnatural motion. 
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evidence for harm in any of the available epidemiological studies by 
citing the limited quality of these studies and the presence of multiple 
confounders and diverse sources of harm, pollution and vulnerability in 
the interested area (Hurtig & San Sebastian, 2005, Terracini, 2005). 
However, other experts in the same field argued that no risk could be 
inferred from existent evidence, due to an absence of statistically sound 
correlation data. Although the quality of the population study is poor, 
they explain, it is still far more relevant than mechanistic evidence, 
given that such evidence is obtained in models with low biological 
relevance for humans (Siemiatycki, 2002). One could add here that 
mechanistic understanding is unreliable because it is based on our cur-
rent understanding of biological patterns of toxicity, which is at any time 
incomplete (Howick, 2011). 
These explanations are internally consistent, and consistent with the 
available evidence. They produce testable predictions (for instance, with 
the production of better population data), thus the explanatory account 
cannot rule any of them out. Interestingly, as in the case of Galilei, part 
of the argumentation for each explanation relies on attacking the “norms 
of inquiry” adopted in the opposing view. This is a debate over “norms of 
inquiry” which, in the case of Galilei, was resolved through the selection 
of ontological background assumptions. Douglas’ framework does not 
consider this route, but rather calls for an institutional response in cases 
like this (Douglas, 2012, p. 158). 
This is the point where we wish to develop Douglas’ framework. 
Before calling for an institutional response, there is a possible way to 
further limit the number of acceptable explanations. Our suggested 
route is to follow Galilei in making use of the relation between ontology 
and norms of inquiry. In cases of diverging norms of inquiry, we can 
investigate whether there are diverging ontological assumptions moti-
vating these norms. In cases where there are diverging ontologies, we 
will argue for a strategy that determines which of the ontologies is more 
suitable. In order to see how this fits into Douglas’ overall approach, we 
must first go into more detail concerning what Douglas takes to be an 
acceptable explanation. 
4. Consistency, unification and converse abduction 
Douglas demands that an explanation must be internally consistent 
and writes about three types of consistencies. One concerns consistent 
and rigorous applications of selection criteria for evidence: “It would not 
be acceptable to exclude a study for a methodological flaw, and then to 
include other studies even though they have the same flaw, merely 
because they support the desired conclusion” (Douglas, 2012, p. 153). 
We take this type of methodological consistency to be uncontroversial. 
A second type of consistency discussed by Douglas is of a logical 
form: “If we could derive any random empirical consequence from 
[explanations], they are unaccountable to the evidence” (Ibid). I.e., the 
explanation can neither be tautological nor self-contradictory. This 
version of consistency also plays to Douglas’ general understanding of 
explanations as tightly connected to predictions (see Douglas, 2009). 
The logical type of consistency ensures that a specific explanation is not 
self-contradictory, from which any empirical result would follow. As 
such, we take it to be uncontroversial as well. 
A third type of consistency relates to unification. Douglas (2009) 
deals explicitly with the unification model of explanation. Here she 
points out that such an account of explanation is limited, with which we 
concur. 
“[…] the unification model works best for laws explaining other 
sufficiently disparate laws and seems to provide no account for 
explanation of single instances, where we often appeal to specific 
causes rather than a unifying law.” (Douglas, 2009: 425) 
Furthermore 
“ […] in some cases, merely unifying various instances (e.g. of 
particular metals expanding when heated) under a general law 
(metals expand when heated) is hardly explanatory at all.” (ibid) 
Douglas’ argument relates to the (lack of) utility that results from 
using the unification of a set of phenomena as a form of explanation. In 
this sense, we agree with Douglas that unifying explanations are limited. 
Nevertheless, there is a further relation between unification and con-
sistency that Douglas does not consider. In cases of multiple defendable 
explanations, be it law-like, causal or other, one can define the most 
consistent as the one that is most unified, in the sense that it coheres 
better in the wider context. In other words, an explanation of a set of 
phenomena studied in molecular biology is preferable if it coheres with 
established biological knowledge. As different sub-fields of biology often 
deal with different phenomena, one could ask how such coherence can 
be established. One way, we suggest, is to look directly at ontology. 
What are the common ontological claims of biology in general? How do 
they fit with the ontological assumptions underlying this specific 
explanation? In total, this implies that when faced with multiple ex-
planations of a set of phenomena, we choose the better explanation, and 
thus the norms of inquiry, based on the dominant ontology of the field. 
This is a version of what Myrstad (2004) calls converse abduction,3 which 
is in contrast the inference to best explanation (IBE) approach of the type 
we see in Douglas (2012). 
When applying an IBE description, evidence is gathered and 
explained, and we adopt the best available explanation on the basis of a 
set of criteria. In other words, the theories follow the evidence. Douglas’ 
approach is to adopt IBE and add restrictions. With a converse abduction 
approach, instead, there is no strict motion from evidence to explana-
tion, but rather a dynamical relationship between explanations, evi-
dence and ontological background assumptions. The layer of ontological 
background assumptions is the foundation of this relationship. The 
central issue is to demand that any specific explanation is consistent 
with this foundational level. As in all scientific thinking, explanations 
are constrained by evidence. In Douglas’ explanatory approach, expla-
nations are further constrained by adequacy criteria. In the converse 
abduction approach, adequate interpretations of data are also con-
strained by the ontological background assumptions. It must be possible 
to express the entire explanation in accordance with the same set of 
ontological background assumptions, and the explanation that does this 
best is preferable. 
We suggest that in cases where there are multiple adequate expla-
nations, one should apply a criterion of ontological unity. Rather than seek 
the consistency of the single explanation, which is already guaranteed 
through Douglas’ (2012) criterion of internal consistency, we now seek 
consistency between the ontological background assumptions of a specific 
explanation and the ontological background assumptions of current general 
scientific knowledge in the field. For instance, in the case of oil contami-
nation described earlier, the already established ontological background 
assumptions in biology and environmental studies should play a regu-
latory role. Notice that, for the criterion to work as a problem solver, it 
must be possible to identify a dominant ontological framework in a 
rather clear and uncontroversial way. In the following case study, we 
provide one example where this can be done. One of us made similar 
identifications in relation to basic science (Andersen, 2017; Andersen 
et al., 2018). Whether and how this approach can be generalized, how 
one can identify cases where it is useful, and who should be in charge of 
this analysis within the process of decision making are matters for future 
research. The aim of this paper is simply to show that this approach is 
3 Myrstad (2004) argues convincingly that the converse abduction approach 
was the approach Kepler used to establish his three laws of planetary motion. 
This implies that the standard use of Kepler as an authority for IBE approaches, 
as is done for instance in Hanson (1958), is confusing rather than explaining the 
history of science. 
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possible and worth pursuing. 
The criterion of ontological unity does not, in and of itself, perform 
any additional explanatory work. Rather, it helps fend off ad-hoc ex-
planations in relation to specific cases. This would work by having sci-
entists develop explanations and predictions of specific topics according 
to Douglas’ (2012) description. Explanations would then be tested for 
adequacy according to Douglas’ criteria of internal consistency, empir-
ical competence, and predictive potential. If, at this point, there are still 
multiple explanations available, we apply the criterion of ontological 
unity. First, implicit assumptions must be made explicit. This is in line 
with Douglas’ notion of objectivity, as expressed in Douglas (2000), and 
adds to the much needed transparency of evidence-based policies. 
We recognize that our approach makes evidence-based policies 
somewhat conservative, and that newer, less established assumptions 
will be downgraded. We think, however, that this is acceptable and even 
laudable in evidence-based policy making. Indeed, a major motivation 
behind evidence-based policies is that policy should be built on estab-
lished science. Furthermore, the criterion of ontological unity appeals to 
the unified views of not just a single scientist, but rather the majority of 
scientists in a set of fields, thereby increasing the level of consistency or 
unity between basic science and evidence-based policies. In the 
following, we provide an example of how this can be put into practice. 
5. The criterion of ontological unity in practice: The case of 
stacked genetically modified plants 
5.1. The scientific disagreement over the safety of stacked genetically 
modified plants 
As described above, in order to be able to apply the criterion of 
ontological unity, it is necessary to first identify and explicate the 
different ontological background assumptions underlying different ex-
planations of the same evidence. This can be an intricate and time- 
consuming process. Here we will use a case where the ontological 
background assumptions were previously explicated through a qualita-
tive analysis of scientific argumentations (Rocca & Andersen, 2017). 
In the case at hand, experts disagree over the evidence for the mo-
lecular stability and food safety of a particular type of genetically 
modified (GM) plants called “stacked” GM. 
Traditionally, farmers have been changing the genetic makeup of 
crops by breeding them and selecting for the desired trait(s). This pro-
cess is called conventional plant breeding, and its products are conventional 
hybrids. These are generally considered safe and do not need to be risk 
assessed before commercialization. Currently, however, more technol-
ogies are available for this same purpose of genetic improvement. In 
particular, transgenic plant transformation is the introduction of DNA 
material from a different species (plant, bacterium or other) into the 
plant’s genome, with the purpose of introducing a new trait. When 
successful, this results in single genetically modified (GM) plants. It is 
globally agreed that single GM plants need to be assessed for safety in 
connection with food consumption and environmental impact before 
they are introduced in the market. 
It is often desirable to have more than one transgenic trait in the 
same plant. Say, for instance, that one wants to accumulate the trans-
genic traits R1 and R2, which confer resistance to two different types of 
parasites. This can be done through the conventional breeding of two 
single GM plants, one containing R1 and the other containing R2, and 
the subsequent selection of the desired offspring (containing both R1 
and R2). This process is called stacking of GM traits, and its products are 
designated as stacked GM plants (GM Stacks). The risk assessment pro-
tocol of GM Stacks is the object of our case of disagreement. Some 
governmental agencies handle GM Stacks as new genetically modified 
organisms and require a new and full process of risk assessment before 
approving them for commercialization. Other countries consider GM 
Stacks as products of conventional breeding and therefore impose 
minimal regulatory requirements. 
Central to this regulatory disagreement is the issue of whether it is 
possible to infer knowledge concerning the molecular and toxicological 
properties of a GM Stack from knowledge concerning the molecular and 
toxicological properties of its parental GM (single) plants. The American 
regime, for instance, assumes inference as the default starting point. 
Additional testing is required only in cases where one can reasonably 
expect that the transgenes and their products will interact (Pilacinski 
et al., 2011). 
Scientists offered arguments both in favor of and against the 
simplification of GM stacks regulation following the American model 
(Agapito-Tenfen et al., 2014; Ben Ali et al., 2014; Kok et al., 2014; 
Kramer et al., 2016; Londo et al., 2011; Mesnage et al., 2013; Steiner 
et al., 2013; Weber et al., 2012). Based on the same scientific evidence, 
experts provide different explanations and reach two opposite 
conclusions. 
Conclusion 1: information about the risk from GM Stacks can be 
inferred from the evidence provided during the risk assessment of the 
parental GM (single) plants. 
Conclusion 2: GM stacks are new GM plants. Some issues cannot be 
inferred from the risk assessment of single GM parental plants and 
require generation of new evidence. 
In Rocca & Andersen, (2017), we hypothesized that this scientific 
debate could be explored in light of the diverging ontological back-
ground assumptions that underlie the different explanations of common 
evidence. We corroborated the hypothesis by reviewing and analyzing 
experts’ arguments in the scientific literature. Specifically, we found 
that each argumentation relies on a set of necessary, implicit, and un-
stated premises, which we diagnosed as “biological background as-
sumptions”. For brevity, we here consider only two such diverging 
assumptions: “equivalence of entity behavior” and “variability of entity 
behavior”. 
Briefly, “equivalence of entity behavior” is the assumption that genes 
and their products behave equivalently in parental GM (single) and GM 
Stacks. Explanation of the evidence that leads to conclusion 1 adopt such 
assumptions. On the contrary, conclusion 2 assumes “variability of en-
tity behavior,” which is the assumption that genes and their products 
might behave dissimilarly in parental GM (single) and GM Stacks. This 
implies that the same biological entities might behave differently across 
contexts. 
5.2. Equivalence and Variability of Entity Behavior 
As made plain in Rocca & Andersen, (2017), Equivalence and Vari-
ability of Entity Behavior are two different background assumptions 
about context sensitivity in biological systems. 
Scientists arguing for conclusion 1 (the safety of GM Stacks can be 
inferred from the safety of the parental, single GM plants) maintain that 
the only difference between conventional hybrids, parental single GM 
plants and GM Stacks is the presence of none, one or two transgenic 
inserts. The interactions between each of the transgenic traits with all 
the other traits of the plants have, therefore, already been considered in 
each of the parental single GM risk assessments. The only remaining 
issue is whether the two transgenic proteins will interact with each 
other. This can be predicted with a sufficient degree of confidence from 
knowledge of the intrinsic properties of such proteins and how they 
behave in other contexts. 
In this view, context sensitivity is understood as a pool of interactions 
that are external to the entities involved (genes and proteins). Genes and 
proteins behave differently in different contexts, but these different sets 
of behaviors are still made possible by the entities’ intrinsic properties, 
which are maintained across contexts. The interactions are not consti-
tutive of entities: they are external to them (compare Guttinger, 2018). 
Scientists arguing for conclusion 2 (some information about GM 
Stacks might not be directly inferred from the safety of the parental 
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single GM plants) conceptualize a GM Stack as a new, different whole 
rather than the addition of two transgenic traits to a common genetic 
background. Accordingly, they are not satisfied by the targeted com-
parison of some components of single parental GM and GM Stacks. 
Rather, they argue that the totality of such plant components should be 
compared-with untargeted comparison methodologies, such as prote-
omics, metabolomics et cetera. By requiring specific evidence for GM 
Stacks, one adopts the premise that the process of GM stacking confers 
new interacting properties to all the entities involved (and not only to 
the transgenic traits). In this view, what entities (DNA and proteins) can 
do is not strictly determined by their intrinsic nature. Rather, it is also 
determined by the kind of interactions in which they are involved. In 
other words, context and interactions are an integral part of the entities’ 
properties, and not only external to them. Therefore, properties and 
behavior of entities cannot be inferred directly across contexts. 
The discrepancy between these two ontological background as-
sumptions recalls previous discourses in philosophy and biology. The 
same dichotomy, for instance, was described in terms of a “machine view” 
versus “ecological model” of the world (Birch & Cobb, 1981) or in terms 
of “complicatedness” versus “complexity” (Kvaløy, 1992). Similarly, bio-
logical systems have been categorized into component systems - systems 
in which the behavior of the parts and the way they interact with the 
environment is mainly “intrinsically determined” (Bechtel & Richard-
son, 2010, p. 26) - and integrated systems, in which the parts lose their 
original identity, and their behavior is mainly determined through in-
teractions with the context (ibid). 
5.3. Applying the criterion of ontological unity 
Which of the two ontological background assumptions identified is 
the most scientifically justifiable? This is difficult to determine, when 
only considering the specific evidence about the molecular and toxico-
logical stability of conventional hybrids such as single GM and GM 
Stacks. 
However, it is possible to expand our analysis by testing the validity 
of such assumptions against current biological knowledge. This is what 
is posited by the criterion of ontological unity. 
Here, we will apply the criterion and argue that the accumulating 
knowledge in the general field of biology motivates a move toward, 
rather than away from, a description of life compatible with Variability 
of Entity Behavior. Based on what we described above, this implies 
showing a move toward an ecological or integrated view of living sys-
tems. Note that this is not trivial, in so far as it is not only about the 
knowledge that living entities (and their parts) change behavior in 
different contexts (external relations). Rather, it is about a move toward 
the notion that properties and behavior of living entities (and their 
parts) are induced, to the greatest extent, by their contextual in-
teractions (constitutive relations). Given such premise, an argument in 
favor of Variability of Entity Behavior could run as follows.  
(1) In recent decades, accumulating evidence has provoked a number 
of paradigm changes in numerous fields of biology.  
(2) A common feature of such changes is that they confer an 
increased role of relations and context in shaping the properties 
of living systems.  
(3) The general field of biology seems united by a move away from 
the assumption of Equivalence of Entity Behavior and toward an 
assumption of Variability of Entity Behavior.  
(4) If we want unity with the current best theories in the field of 
biology, evaluations of the evidence of safety of GM Stacks ought 
to include explanations that are based on Variability of Entity 
Behavior. 
Clearly, it is critical that statement (2) is thoroughly motivated. 
Which are the paradigm changes that support this argument? For a start, 
let us look in detail at one of them: the change of paradigm in the way 
proteins are understood (Dunker et al., 2001; Tompa, 2012; Uversky, 
2011). 
Proteins are chains of amino acids, each serving one or multiple 
functions within the cell. For the last century, the “structure-function” 
paradigm, stating that the function of a protein is determined by its 
three-dimensional structure, has been central to understanding proteins. 
Biochemistry textbooks explain, using the classic “key-and-keyhole” 
metaphor, that because of its three-dimensional structure each protein 
interacts only with specific complementary structures. The way a pro-
tein interacts with the surrounding molecules is, therefore, determined 
by its properties, which remain unchanged across contexts. Predictions 
about proteins’ behavior in different environments can in this way be 
inferred from one context to another. The “structure-function” paradigm 
is in perfect line with the ontological background assumption Equiva-
lence of Entity Behavior. 
This view has changed since the discovery that many proteins 
contain the so-called intrinsically disordered domains (IDP), whose 
function does not depend on a pre-determined three-dimensional 
structure (Dunker et al., 2001). IDP do not acquire a unique and stable 
shape, but rather they shift between multiple structural organizations. 
Crucially, IDP’s function is not performed solely by each of the spatial 
structures, but also by the process of de-folding and re-folding itself. In 
turn, such a process is induced by complementary proteins, as well as by 
interactions with the solvent’s aqueous environment. This new para-
digm, the “binding-folding”, shifts the focus toward the dynamic nature 
of many protein functions. Proteins’ behaviors are no longer seen as 
exclusively dependent on pre-existent properties but as co-determined 
by the dynamic interactions with the environment. This interaction 
can be seen as synergistic, since IDP and their surroundings modify each 
other’s properties (Guttinger, 2018; Stein, 2004; Tompa, 2012). 
This paradigm shift, in which context sensitivity is not entirely an 
intrinsic capacity of the protein, but it is determined by the context it-
self, can be seen as a move toward an understanding of the world in line 
with the assumption Variability of Entity Behavior. 
Importantly for the criterion of ontological unity, this example does 
not represent an isolated case. Instead, a similar shift is happening 
simultaneously in the so-called “post-genomic” era of biology. After the 
big effort in clarifying the structures of genes and proteins, the scientific 
community is striving to understand how such entities work in systems. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that knowing the properties of the parts 
sheds only limited light on the function of living systems. Biologist Denis 
Noble, one of the pioneers of system biology, expresses it as follows: 
“Each system has its own logic. It is not possible to understand that 
logic merely by investigating the properties of the system’s compo-
nents. […] at this stage of our exploration of life, we must be ready 
for a basic re-think. […] System biology […] requires that we 
develop ways of thinking about integration that are as rigorous as 
our reductionist procedures, but different. This is a major change. It 
has implications beyond the pure scientific. It means changing our 
philosophy, in the full sense of the term.” (Noble, 2006: x-xi) 
By a “change of philosophy,” Noble means that “reduction alone is 
far from sufficient” (ibid). Similarly, another manifesto of process 
biology states: 
“The reductionist approach has successfully identified most of the 
components and many of the interactions but, unfortunately, offers 
no convincing concepts or methods to understand how system 
properties emerge […] the pluralism of causes and effects in bio-
logical networks is better addressed by observing […] multiple 
components simultaneously.” (Sauer et al., 2007: 550). 
In line with this, some biological disciplines are heading toward an 
increased “ecological” attitude, which allows the context to have an 
important, active, and constitutive role in living systems. As a well- 
established example, ecological developmental biology acknowledges 
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that “The regulators of gene expression need not all reside within the 
embryo.” (Gilbert, 2001, p. 1). 
With the steady accumulation of this type of evidence, it is possible to 
argue that the basic ontological assumptions of Equivalence of Entity 
Behavior - which sees the context sensitivity of genes and proteins as an 
intrinsic property that is largely determined by the entities themselves, 
allowing for confident predictions of component behavior across con-
texts - is increasingly obsolete in the general field of biology. 
6. Implications and future directions 
Disagreement in science has led not only to an impasse for decision 
makers but also to a decreasing trust in science by the general public. 
Douglas (2012) urges us to improve the situation by demanding argu-
mentative adequacy: it does not suffice to account for the data. The data 
must be explained, and the explanations must be empirically competent, 
internally consistent and show predictive potency. 
We have taken Douglas’ approach as our starting point, whilst add-
ing that Douglas’ Inference to Best Explanation account is impotent in 
cases where there are multiple adequate explanations (under-
determination). We have also argued that such cases are prevalent and 
that they illustrate the role of ontological background assumptions in 
scientific explanation. 
The Inference to Best Explanation account is often the go-to 
description of scientific reasoning. In contrast to IBE, others have 
argued that a complete account of scientific reasoning must include 
Converse Abduction strategies. This has implications not only for the 
understanding of how modern science was originally formulated, but 
also for how we should approach evidence evaluation in cases of 
evidential underdetermination. We propose to apply converse abduction 
to the cases where multiple adequate explanations persist, by favoring 
the explanation whose ontological background assumptions unify better 
with the current ontological background assumptions of the relevant 
scientific fields. This has implications for the way science should advise 
decision-making. 
Currently, expert panel reviews consist of technocratic evaluations, 
judging the quality of the experimental design by focusing on experi-
mental set-up, sample sizes, statistical analyses, model choices et cetera 
(Giorgi Rossi, 2016). If we are to appeal to the criterion of ontological 
unity, we must include a wide variety of experts who can identify the 
ontological background assumptions of not only specific explanations, 
but also trends and mainstream knowledge in the field. Importantly, this 
is a timely implication for our account, since it echoes critical voices 
coming from some of the participants on expert panels. In response to 
perennial controversies about the significance of evidence from medical 
research for the purposes of clinical recommendations, some of the ex-
perts urge that the discussion should be directed to a level that is deeper 
than the mere evaluation of experimental design. In order to deepen the 
discussion, we need to involve a multiplicity of expertise: 
“ […] as we assess evidence, we need to select or formulate conjec-
tures that explain most of the evidence available. In order to decide 
on such conjectures, we require individuals who are familiar with the 
epidemiology and the etiology of the disease, as well as with the 
rationale behind the technologies or interventions proposed. Finally, 
we need individuals who know the strengths and the weaknesses of 
alternative conjectures; in other words, we also require content ex-
perts.” (Giorgi Rossi, 2016: 22) 
We take these exhortations to be completely in line with our stance. 
We suggest that if this is done, evidence-based policy making will in-
crease in both efficiency and precision. 
Finally, our analysis indicates the complex interaction between 
different types of non-empirical assumptions in evidence-based policy. 
Indeed, the presented case suggests that socio-political and ontological 
assumptions have a mutual valence. For example, the “equivalence” 
assumption is connected to deregulatory interests, since it entails no 
need for additional testing and presents no new barriers to market 
availability. Thus, if yield increases from stacked events, one might also 
increase food production and economic growth without additional 
delay. In contrast, the “variability” assumption is linked to regulation 
motivated by public health and environmental protection, since it re-
quires additional testing that puts up barriers to stacked GMs quickly 
moving to market. Whether or not scientists and policy makers are 
aware of such a socio-political connection, the social stakes and possible 
ethical consequences of their ontological background assumptions 
remain. Douglas’ inductive risk argument couples the norms of inquiry 
chosen by scientists with the consequences that norms can have at the 
societal level and calls for an increased awareness and responsibility of 
the scientists in this respect (Douglas, 2000). Since we argued here that 
ontological background assumptions are strictly inter-related with 
norms of inquiry and epistemic choices of scientists and decision 
makers, we urge that such ontological assumptions should be included 
in the discourse of responsibility and values in science. 
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